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I. INTRODUCTION
From 1967 to 1972 Bernice Gera fought in court to achieve her
goal of umpiring Class A minor league baseball.' Gera prevailed,
* B.A., 1972, Albertus Magnus College; J.D., 1975, University of Connecticut Law
School; M.A., 1980, Trinity College (Hartford, CT); Ph.D., 1985, University of California at
Los Angeles. Dr. McEvoy is an Associate Professor of Business Law at Fairfield University,
Fairfield, Connecticut and a practicing attorney.
1. Obituary: Bernice Gera, Umpire, 61, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1992, at A22. See also
PAM POSTEMA & GENE WOJCIECHOWSKI, YOU'VE GOT TO HAVE BALLS TO MAKE IT IN THIS
LEAGUE 20-21 (1992).
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but her minor league career was short-lived. Following her first mi-
nor league game, Gera quit, claiming that she was disenchanted
with the job when the other umpires refused to cooperate with her
on the field.2 Furthermore, she faced harassment off the field and
even received death threats' Only a few women besides Gera have
worked in the minor leagues to date; no woman has ever umpired
in the major leagues.4
Recently, one woman, Pamela Postema, has taken Gera's
cause one step further by filing suit to gain entry into the male
bastion of major league baseball umpiring.5 Postema, a minor
league umpire for thirteen years, initiated a sex discrimination
lawsuit against a number of professional baseball organizations in
1991 because she was not promoted to the major league umpiring
ranks in 1989 and was fired from the minor league position she
held at the time.'
In recent years, aided by favorable legislation and court deci-
sions, women have been making inroads into such formerly all-
male professions as law, accounting, and corporate management.
This Article will examine Pamela Postema's case in light of other
recent cases involving women who have sought a foothold in male-
dominated professions. The Article will also explore the impact on
Postema's case of such laws as the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and
1991. This Article concludes that, despite recent progress in the
caselaw and legislation, the lawsuit instituted by Pamela Postema
to gain a major league umpiring position remains an uncertain
quest.
II. BACKGROUND
There were no working women umpires in minor league base-
ball7 when Pam Postema responded to an ad in a local Florida
2. Obituary: Bernice Gera, Umpire, 61, supra note 1, at A22.
3. POSTEMA & WOJCIECHOWSKI, supra note 1, at 20.
4. Obituary: Bernice Gera, Umpire, 61, supra note 1, at A22.
5. Postema v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, American League of
Professional Baseball Clubs, Triple-A Alliance of Professional Baseball Clubs, and Baseball
Office of Umpire Dev., 799 F. Supp. 1475 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) [hereinafter Postema v. National
League].
6. M.P. McQueen, She Claims Baseball Foul: Woman Umpire Claims Sex Bias,
NEWSDAY, Dec. 20, 1991, at 6.
7. Bernice Gera quit after umpiring one game in 1972, and Postema's only other pred-
ecessor, Christine Wren, quit for a better paying job in 1977, after umpiring in the minor
leagues for two years. Sandy Keenan, The Umpress Strikes Back, SPORTS ILLUS., July 30,
1984, at 45.
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newspaper for the Al Somers Umpire School in Daytona Beach.8
She had to fight to get into the school, whose founder said,
"There'll never be a woman student in my school. It's just not a
job for a woman." The school had no women's restrooms 0 when
Postema and another woman were eventually accepted and en-
rolled in the six-week course in 1977.11 She graduated from the
umpire school high in her class,12 and was offered a job in the Gulf
Coast League, the bottom of the minor league circuit."3
For the next thirteen years, Postema umpired some 2,000
games in the minor leagues,' tolerating exhausting travel sched-
ules, low salaries, and a series of umpiring partners, not all of
whom were supportive of her.' 5 The attitude of many of the other
umpires was, "If you have to, work with her. But don't help her.
Don't make it easy.""'
By 1980 Postema had made it to the Texas League, a Double
A League, making her one of only twenty-nine minor league
umpires who were promoted and one of only sixteen to make the
jump from single A to the next level.17
Despite numerous challenges thrown at her, Postema was de-
termined to overcome the obstacles. Although umpiring in the ma-
jor leagues may not be among the top career choices for most
young women, Postema wished to ensure that she would reach the
majors by spending her time in the minor leagues honing her skills,
while surmounting barriers that would discourage even most
men."8 For example, she worked winters in Columbia, where one
manager spat in her face,' 9 and in Puerto Rico and Venezuela,
where fans threw fruit at her and issued death threats.2 0
Postema came as close as one could get to the majors."' Her
8. Linda Lehrer, Big League a Big Step for Female Ump, CONN. POST, July 8, 1992,
at B2.
9. POSTEMA & WOJCIECHOWSKI, supra note 1, at 22.
10. Id. at 23.
11. Lehrer, supra note 8, at B2.
12. Postema finished 17th in a class of 130. Keenan, supra note 7, at 44.
13. Lehrer, supra note 8, at B2. The other woman in the class was not offered a job.
Id.
14. Susan Reed & Lyndon Stambler, The Umpire Strikes Back, PEOPLE, May 25,
1992, at 87.
15. Lehrer, supra note 8, at B2.
16. Reed and Stambler, supra note 14, at 88 (quoting Postema).
17. Lehrer, supra note 8, at B2.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Reed & Stambler, supra note 14, at 88.
21. John Altavilla, Rejected Postema Cries Foul on Baseball, NEW HAVEN REGISTER,
1993]
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assignments included working in winter league ball and seven years
at the Triple A level, where she was crew chief in 1989.22 She was
also chosen to umpire American League exhibition games in 1986,
the 1987 Hall of Fame game in Cooperstown, New York," and the
1989 Triple A All-Star Game.2' Reportedly, she was given serious
consideration for two openings in the National League in 1989 af-
ter umpiring their spring training games in 1988 and 1989.25
Despite her achievements, in 1989 an evaluation report by the
league office for Umpire Development claimed that Postema's work
had "deteriorated" in the area of "enthusiasm and execution,"
even though that office had rated her "better than average" earlier
that season. 6
The Triple A baseball league has a rule that if after three
years an umpire is not being considered for promotion, the league
will release that person to make room for other up-and-coming
umpires. Y Postema had worked in the Triple A league for six
years," when in November 1989 she was notified by the league
that she had been fired." The judgment was that Postema simply
did not have the ability to work in the major leagues.30 Pamela
Postema, the woman who came closest to becoming a major league
umpire, took a job making deliveries for Federal Express.3 1
Postema realized that she had hit baseball's equivalent of the
glass ceiling when she saw that the major leagues were not within
the grasp of a female umpire. 2 Postema declared, "Women had to
sue to get into the minor leagues, so I guess women will have to sue
to get into the majors. '3 3 Hence, in 1991 Postema filed a charge of
sex discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC).
III. THE CASE
After receiving a right to sue letter from the EEOC, Postema
July 30, 1990, at 28.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Postema v. National League, 799 F. Supp. at 1478.
25. Altavilla, supra note 21, at 28.
26. Reed and Stambler, supra note 14, at 87.
27. Lehrer, supra note 8, at B2.
28. Altavilla, supra note 21, at 28.
29. Reed & Stambler, supra note 14, at 88.
30. Altavilla, supra note 21, at 28.
31. Altavifla, supra note 21, at 28.
32. Lehrer, supra note 8, at B2.
33. Id.
[Vol. 11:1
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filed suit in the United States District Court in Manhattan, nam-
ing as defendants the National League, the American League, the
minor league Triple A Alliance, and the Baseball Office of Umpire
Development.3 ' Postema sought a jury trial, back pay, and punitive
damages. 5 In addition, she requested that the court order the ma-
jor leagues to hire her for the next available umpire opening.3
Postema's suit alleges that "a longstanding prejudice against
women" is the only reason that she and other women have not
been able to break into the major leagues.3 7 The suit accuses the
leagues of tolerating and even encouraging a work environment in
which she was subjected to frequent sexual harassment. 8 Postema
further contends that less qualified males were hired and promoted
ahead of her as a result of a prejudice against women and alleges
the existence of a conspiracy to keep her and other women from
becoming major league umpires.39 She further claims she was un-
fairly fired by the Triple A Alliance when neither the American
nor the National League hired her.'0
Postema will have an uphill climb convincing the courts that
her performance merits an opportunity to work in the major
leagues. The problem is that the decision to fire her, like the past
decisions that promoted her, was made subjectively by supervisors
who work without score cards.' 1 Her work over a thirteen-year pe-
riod and the high regard in which managers and players held her,
however, casts doubt on the motivations of the men who made the
call that she was not qualified for the job.'2 One baseball veteran,
former San Francisco Giants manager Roger Craig, said, "I don't
know why she lost her job. She was a pretty good umpire,' 8 a view
echoed by such baseball officials as Atlanta Braves General Man-
ager Bobby Cox, New York Yankees owner George Steinbrenner,
and the late baseball commissioner, A. Bartlett Giamatti."
34. McQueen, supra note 6, at 2.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Christi Harlan & R. Gustav Niebuhr, Former Umpire Sues Professional Baseball
for Sex Discrimination, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 1991, at B2.
38. Id.
39. Alex Michelini, Ump Cries Foul: She Sues the Big Leagues, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
Dec. 20, 1991, at 4.
40. Judge Rules for Postema, NEW HAVEN REGISTER, July 18, 1992, at 24.
41. Altavilla, supra note 21, at 28.
42. David Hinckley, Baseline Bigotry: The Umpire Strikes Back, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
July 21, 1992, at 35.
43. Reed & Stambler, supra note 14, at 88.
44. POSTEMA & WOJCIECHOWSKI, supra note 1, at 162. Steinbrenner reportedly said,
"She can umpire the Yankees anytime she wants." Id.
1993]
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Postema's own book about her experiences does not make a
convincing case for her elevation to the major leagues, as it reports
that she often blew calls and ejected players or managers. 45 In ad-
dition, Postema modestly rated herself a 3.5 on a scale of 5.46 As
one reviewer put it, "[A] B-minus candidate is not an irresistible
choice for surmounting baseball's sex barrier. 47
Whatever Postema's credentials to umpire in the majors-and
many sportswriters felt she would have been neither the best nor
the worst-it is clear, as one writer put it, that "the boys who de-
cide still aren't comfortable with girls in the club."4 Of course, at
one time, the baseball establishment said Satchel Paige and Josh
Gibson were not major league material because the major leagues
did not let African-American men play. Postema is convinced that
the same exclusionary principle exists today for women. 9
Is she right? Even if baseball's decision was correct and she is
not "major league material," the obstacles thrown in her path over
the years cast doubt on the objectivity of those who made the
calls.5 Postema's case details the forms of sexual harassment she
endured as a woman on exclusively male turf.51 She was subjected
to harassment in the form of verbal assaults from players and fans,
including incessant comments about her anatomy and sexual pref-
erence.52 She also endured such acts as a manager kissing her on
the lips after handing her a lineup card and a team mascot pulling
a brassiere from his shirt.53
On July 17, 1992, Judge Robert P. Patterson ruled that Pos-
tema's suit against professional baseball for sex discrimination
could go to trial. 4 The judge dismissed Postema's claim against
the American League, ruling that she cannot sue the American
League for discrimination in hiring because the league had hired
too few new umpires to establish a pattern of discrimination. 5
45. Felicia E. Halpert, You've Got to Have Balls to Make It in This League, N.Y.
TIMES BOOK REV., May 24, 1992, at 14 (book review).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Hinckley, supra note 42, at 35.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Postema v. National League, 799 F. Supp. at 1478-1479.
52. Halpert, supra note 45, at 14.
53. Id. See also POSTEMA & WoJcL.cHowSKI, supra note 1, at 163-64.
54. Postema v. National League, 799 F. Supp. at 1489-90. See also Jonathan M.
Moses, Major League Discrimination Suit by Woman Baseball Umpire Can Go to Trial,
WALL ST. J., July 20, 1992, at B6.
55. Moses, supra note 54, at B6. Between 1988 and 1992 the American League hired
only one new umpire. Id.
[Vol. 11:1
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Postema's claim against the National League for not hiring her is
still pending because that league had more openings. 6 Indeed, this
fact may be the Achilles' heel of Postema's case. Martin Spring-
stead, American League executive director for umpiring, notes that
at the time there were only thirty-two jobs in the American League
and twenty-eight in the National League, with a low turnover rate,
making it difficult for anyone, even qualified males, to make it.5
7
In her book Postema argues that baseball is about survival
and the diamond is a battle zone where umpires are the most visi-
ble and loneliest targets." Still, umpiring in the major leagues was
her dream, and she was willing to face daunting odds to achieve
it.59
IV. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Postema is not the first woman to have faced such odds to
achieve her goal. Many women have faced similar situations and
have attempted to vindicate their rights. For nearly thirty years
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act60 had been the chief vehicle
to achieve these ends.
A. History and Purpose of Title VI
It is an ironic but well-known fact that Title VII's prohibition
against sex discrimination in employment had a dubious origin. It
was not until the last day of the bill's consideration by the House
Rules Committee that there first appeared a motion to add "sex"
discrimination to the other types of employment discrimination al-
ready in the bill."1 The motion was defeated by a vote of 8-7.6 2
56. Id.
57. Reed & Stambler, supra note 14, at 88.
58. Halpert, supra note 45, at 14.
59. See POSTEAs & WOJCIECHOWSKI, supra note 1, at id.
60. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (West 1981 & Supp. 1993). Title VII provides in pertinent
part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
The term "employer" for purposes of Title VII means "a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year .... " Id. § 2000e(b).
61. Leo Kantrowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law III: Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 305, 310 (1968).
62. Id.
1993]
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Two weeks later, after a debate on the floor of the House, and
one day before the law was passed, Representative Howard Smith,
who opposed the bill, offered an amendment to include "sex" as a
prohibited basis for discrimination. 3 Since he had been a principal
opponent of the legislation along with many other Southern repre-
sentatives, it is clear that the reason that the amendment was in-
troduced was to prevent the law from being passed and not be-
cause of a concern for protecting women against discrimination."
As a result of Smith's amendment to "kill" the bill, the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, which did indeed pass, included a provision protecting
women's rights, along with prohibitions against employment dis-
crimination based on race, color, religion, and national origin.65
In general, the purpose of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 is to eliminate employer and union practices that discrimi-
nate against employees and job applicants who fall into the five
protected categories.66
The Supreme Court has created two legal theories under
which one may prove a case of unlawful employment discrimina-
tion: disparate treatment and disparate impact. 7 A disparate
treatment claim exists when an employer treats some people less
favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. Proving an employer's discriminatory motive is
critical in a disparate treatment case."' This is the theory under
which Postema's case is brought.
A disparate impact claim may be brought when an employer's
facially neutral employment practices, such as hiring or promotion
examinations, make no direct reference to race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin and are neutrally applied but have an adverse
impact on a protected group. 9 Under the disparate impact theory,
it is no defense for an employer to demonstrate that he or she did
not intend to discriminate.7 0
While the Act defines what employment activities are unlaw-
ful, section 703 exempts several key practices from the scope of
63. Id. at 310-11.
64. Id. at 311.
65. Id. at 312. Rep. Edith Green of Oregon believed that legislation against sex dis-
crimination in employment "considered by itself, and... brought to the floor with no hear-
ings and no testimony... would not [have] receive[d] one hundred votes." Id. at 310 (citing
110 CONG. REC. 2720 (1964)).
66. See DAVID P. TwoMEY, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY LAW 2 (2d ed. 1990).
67. Id. at 5.
68. Id. at 6.
69. Id.
70. Id.
[Vol. II:I
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Title VII enforcement. For example, the Act stipulates that it shall
not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire
employees on the basis of their religion, sex, or national origin in
those instances when religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ) reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of the enterprise.71 Because the BFOQ exception
is construed narrowly by the Court and the burden of proving bus-
iness necessity is on the employer,72 it is inconceivable that such a
defense could be used by major league baseball as a reason for de-
nying Postema an umpiring opportunity despite the baseball es-
tablishment's long-held view that umpires should be exclusively
males.
B. What Postema Must Show Under Title VII
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,7 the Supreme Court
discussed how a prima facie showing of discrimination in a dispa-
rate treatment case may be established.74 Based on McDonnell
Douglas, Postema will have to show that she belongs to one of the
groups protected from discrimination under Title VII on the basis
of sex. Next, she must demonstrate that she applied for, and was
qualified for, a job for which the employer (major league baseball)
was seeking applicants and that, despite being qualified, she was
rejected. Finally, she must show that after she was denied a posi-
tion, the job remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants whose qualifications were similar to hers.76
Once Postema establishes a prima facie case, the burden will
shift to professional baseball to articulate some legitimate non-dis-
criminatory reason for its action.76 If the National League and the
Office of Umpire Development offer such a reason, then Postema
will have an opportunity to demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that the supposedly valid reason for baseball's action was
71. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(e) (West 1981). This section provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees ...
on the basis of [their] religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances
where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or en-
terprise ....
Id.
72. TwomEiv, supra note 66, at 34.
73. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
74. Id. at 802.
75. TwomEy, supra note 66, at 49-50.
76. See TwoMEy, supra note 66, at 50.
1993]
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a pretext for a decision that discriminated against her."
Postema will have to prove that she was qualified for the posi-
tion denied her. But how should "qualified" be defined? Must Pos-
tema prove that she was performing at a level that met her em-
ployer's expectations? More importantly, how can she prove her
qualifications, given the subjectivity of her bosses' evaluations? It
will be difficult for her to prove that her umpiring skills were equal
to or superior to those of her male colleagues who made the major
leagues.
Courts are divided over the role that subjective qualifications
for a job, such as leadership, likeability, and loyalty, can play in
determining whether the prima facie case has been made out. Sev-
eral circuits have held that subjective factors are more likely to
mask discrimination and are difficult to evaluate when both objec-
tive and subjective criteria make up job qualifications. All a plain-
tiff like Postema need show is that she satisfies the objective crite-
ria for the job. The National League and Triple A Alliance and
Office of Umpire Development must assert alleged failure to satisfy
subjective standards as part of a rebuttal.s
In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,79 Jus-
tice Powell said that the burden of establishing a prima facie case
of disparate treatment is not onerous.80 Postema must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that she applied for an available
position, for which she was qualified, but was rejected under cir-
cumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimina-
tion.8 1 The prima facie case serves an important function by elimi-
nating the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the
plaintiff's rejection. 2
The Supreme Court further explained the McDonnell Douglas
decision in Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters,83 stating that the
prima facie case raises an inference of discrimination only because
the court presumed that these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are
77. Id.
78. JOEL WILLIAM FRIEDMAN & GEORGE M. STRICKLER, JR., THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 63 (teacher's manual 2d ed. 1990). See also Bienkow-
ski v. American Airlines, 851 F.2d 1503, 1505-1506 (5th Cir. 1988); Burrus v. United Tele-
phone Co. of Kan., 683 F.2d 339, 342 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982);
Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 244-245 (4th Cir. 1982); Lynn v. Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337, 1344-1345 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 823 (1982).
79. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
80. Id. at 253.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 253-54.
83. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
[Vol. II:I
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more likely than not based on consideration of impermissible
factors.4
Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a pre-
sumption that an employer unlawfully discriminated against the
employee. 5 If the judge believes Postema's evidence and if profes-
sional baseball is silent in the face of the presumption, the court
must enter judgment for Postema because no issue of fact will re-
main in the case. 6
If, on the other hand, baseball chooses to rebut the evidence of
discrimination, they must produce evidence that Postema was re-
jected, and someone else was preferred, for a legitimate nondis-
criminatory reason.87 An example of such a reason would be that
the hired person possessed umpiring skills superior to Postema's.
Baseball need not persuade the court that it was actually moti-
vated by the proferred reasons; it is sufficient if their evidence
raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against
Postema. s8 To accomplish this, defendant baseball must clearly set
forth through introduction of admissible evidence, the reason for
Postema's rejection. The explanation must be legally sufficient to
justify a judgment for defendant. 9 If baseball carries the burden of
production, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is re-
butted and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of
specificity.90
Placing the burden of production on baseball serves simulta-
neously to meet Postema's prima facie case by presenting a legiti-
mate reason for the action and to frame factual issues with suffi-
cient clarity so that Postema will have a full and fair opportunity
to demonstrate pretext.9' Although baseball will not bear a formal
burden of persuasion, it nevertheless has an incentive to persuade
the trier of fact that its employment decision was lawful and prove
the factual bias for its explanation.2
Since Postema still retains the burden of persuasion, she now
must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proferred rea-
son was not the true reason for the employment decision. Postema
84. Id. at 577.
85. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 254-55.
89. See id. at 255.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 255-56.
92. See id. at 258.
1993]
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may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indi-
rectly by showing that the proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence. 93 An example of a discriminatory reason that Postema
might use directly is that baseball simply did not want a woman
umpire.
Thus, an employer is required to show that plaintiff's objective
qualifications were inferior to those persons selected. If baseball
cannot make such a showing, a court should conclude that baseball
has discriminated against Postema.
The Burdine opinion makes it clear that Title VII was not in-
tended to diminish traditional management prerogatives." Nor
does it require the employer to restructure his employment prac-
tices to maximize the numbers of minorities and women hired.95
Rather, the Court states, "The broad, overriding interest, shared
by employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient and trustworthy
workmanship assured through fair and ...neutral employment
and personnel decisions." '96
Title VII does not obligate an employer to accord employee
preferences. Rather the employer has discretion to choose among
equally qualified candidates provided the decision is not based
upon unlawful criteria.9 7 Thus, assuming Postema's umpiring abili-
ties were equal to those of the men who applied for major league
umpiring positions, and assuming no gender discrimination was at
play in the selection process, baseball was free under Title VII to
choose among the equally qualified applicants.
V. LEADING GENDER DISCRIMINATION CASES THAT MAY IMPACT
POSTEMA'S CASE
Many women who have sought a foothold in non-traditional
occupations have been forced to go to court to vindicate their
rights under Title VII. Among the leading cases are Hishon v. King
& Spalding98 and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.e9 This section will
examine each of these decisions and analyze how they are relevant
to Pam Postema's lawsuit.
93. See id. at 256.
94. Id. at 259.
95. Id.
96. Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)).
97. Id.
98. 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
99. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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A. Hishon v. King & Spalding
The question raised by Hishon v. King & Spalding was
whether the district court properly dismissed a Title VII complaint
alleging that a law partnership had discriminated against Elizabeth
Hishon, a woman employed as an associate, when it failed to invite
her to become a partner.100
In 1972, after graduating from Columbia Law School, Hishon
accepted a position as an associate with King & Spalding, a large
Atlanta law firm established as a general partnership."' She was
only the second woman to be hired as an associate by the firm. 02
When Hishon filed her suit in 1980, the firm had more than
fifty partners and employed more than fifty associates. Up to that
time, no woman had ever served as a partner in the firm. 0 3
Hishon's complaint alleged, however, that the firm used the possi-
bility of ultimate partnership as a recruiting device to induce her
and other young lawyers to become associates,'" in much the same
way that baseball held out the possibility of a position in the major
leagues to Pam Postema.
In May 1978 the firm considered and rejected Hishon for ad-
mission to the partnership, and one year later the partners again
declined to promote her. 0 5 After her seven years of service, she
was forced to leave the firm. 0 6
Hishon filed a charge with the EEOC on November 17, 1979,
claiming that King & Spalding had discriminated against her be-
cause of her sex in violation of Title VII. 07 The district court dis-
missed the complaint on the grounds that Title VII was inapplica-
ble to the selection of partners by a law partnership, 08 and the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.' 0 9 The Su-
preme Court reversed. 1 0
Several allegations in Hishon's complaint supported the con-
clusion that the opportunity to become a partner was a key ele-
100. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 71.
101. Id.
102. William G. Blair, Victor in Bias Case: Elizabeth Anderson Hishon, N.Y. TiMEs,
May 23, 1984, at D27. The first woman, Antha Mulkey, was an associate for 33 years before
retiring in 1977.
103. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 71.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 72.
106. Blair, supra note 102, at D27.
107. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 72.
108. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) (N. D. Ga. 1980).
109. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir. 1982).
110. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 72-73.
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ment of an associate's status as an employee at King & Spalding.
Hishon alleged that law firm associates could regularly expect to be
considered for a partnership at the end of their apprenticeship and
it appeared that lawyers outside the firm were not routinely con-
sidered."1 Thus, the benefit of the partnership consideration was
allegedly linked directly with an associate's status as an employee,
and the linkage was more than coincidental.11 2 The importance of
the partnership decision to a lawyer's status as an associate is un-
derscored by the fact that an associate's employment is terminated
if the associate is not elected to become partner.'1
3
The Court concluded that Hishon's complaint stated a claim
cognizable under Title VII because her allegations, if proved at
trial, were sufficient to show that partnership consideration was a
term, condition, or privilege of an associate's employment at the
law firm.' 1 4' Accordingly, partnership consideration must be made
without regard to sex." 5
Justice Powell in a concurring opinion said:
In admissions decisions made by law firms, it is now widely rec-
ognized-as it should be-that in fact neither race nor sex is
relevant. The qualities of mind, capacity to reason logically,
ability to work under pressure, leadership, and the like are unre-
lated to race or sex. This is demonstrated by the success of
women and minorities in law schools, in the practice of law, on
the bench, and in positions of community, state, and national
leadership. Law firms-and, of course, society-are the better
for these changes." 6
In Hishon, it was not clear whether the Court concluded that
Congress did not intend for the partnership decision to be covered
by Title VII or that such a construction of Title VII would infringe
upon incumbent partners' right to freedom of association. Never-
theless, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and held that
"in appropriate circumstances" the partnership decision "may"
qualify as a term, condition, or privilege of employment within the
meaning of Title VII."1
111. Id. at 76.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. Title VII protects an employee from discrimination "with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment .. " 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (West
1981).
115. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 76.
116. Id. at 81 (Powell, J., concurring).
117. FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 78, at 16.
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The application of Title VII was appropriate in this case (once
the plaintiff proved the allegations in her complaint) because the
law firm made representations to prospective associates that they
would be considered for partnership after five or six years and that
the firm used this inducement to lure young lawyers to the firm. " s
The Court concluded that the partnership consideration was di-
rectly linked with an associate's status as employer and this consti-
tuted either a contractually undertaken right of employment or a
noncontractual benefit or privilege of employment." '
Women's groups applauded the Supreme Court's decision in
Hishon, asserting that it would prod lawyers, accountants, engi-
neers, architects, investment bankers, and others to elect many
more women as partners in the firms. In response to the Hishon
decision, Timmerman Tepel Daugherty, president of the National
Conference of Women's Bar Associations said, "Inevitably that will
make partners more careful about what they're doing and will
probably lead to more documentation, which means the old-boy
network won't function quite as well. If you've had to create a pa-
per trail of evaluations, it's harder to make someone partner be-
cause he's the son of your golf partner. 1 20
B. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
Despite the optimism generated by Hishon v. King & Spald-
ing, an accounting partnership did not take the Hishon decision to
heart. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,21 Ann Hopkins, a senior
manager for the accounting firm of Price Waterhouse, was pro-
posed for partnership in 1982 but was neither offered nor denied a
position. Instead, her candidacy was held over for reconsideration
the next year. When the partners in her office later refused to
118. FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 78, at 16.
119. Hishon, 467 U.S at 74-75.
120. Tamar Lewin, Impact of Court Ruling Called Mainly Symbolic, N.Y. TIMES, May
23, 1984, at D27. In June 1984 King & Spalding settled the case out of court. Hishon, a
corporate and commercial real estate attorney, accepted a partnership at another firm. She
believes that her case has helped her to attract clients. She speaks on sex discrimination and
still receives telephone calls from women seeking advice on job bias. Indicative of King &
Spalding's attitude toward women is the fact that the firm once staged a bathing suit com-
petition for female summer interns and named a Harvard woman as "the body we'd like to
see more of." Martha Brannigan, The Pioneers: Women Who Fought Sex Bias on the Job
Prove to Be a Varied Group, WALL ST. J., June 8, 1987, at Al, A13. In 1987 there were four
woman partners out of 82 at King & Spalding, and one-third of the associates were women.
Id. See also Getting a Piece of the Power: Women Barred from Partnerships Can Now Go
to Court, TIME, June 4, 194, at 63.
121. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
1993]
15
McEvoy: The Umpire Strikes Out: <em>Postema V. National League</em>: Majo
Published by Institutional Repository, 1993
16 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
repropose her for partnership, she sued under Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, charging that the firm had discriminated against
her on the basis of sex.122
Ruling in Hopkins' favor, the district court held that Price
Waterhouse had unlawfully discriminated against Hopkins on the
basis of sex by "consciously giving credence and effect to partners'
comments about her that resulted from sex stereotyping,"' , and
the court of appeals affirmed."2 " Both courts held that an employer
who has allowed a discriminatory motive to play a part in an em-
ployment decision must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that it would have made the same decision in the absence of dis-
crimination, concluding that Price Waterhouse did not carry the
burden. 1
5
The United State Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower
courts, concluding that when a plaintiff like Hopkins in a Title VII
case shows that gender played a part in an employment decision,
the defendant need prove by only a preponderance of the evidence
that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken
gender into account.126 The Court noted that section 703(a)(1) of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids an employer from making an
adverse decision against an employee because of such individual's
sex, but the preservation of the employer's freedom of choice
means that the employer will not be liable if it can prove that it
would have come to the same decision regardless of the employee's
gender. 127
The Supreme Court's previous decisions demonstrated that if
a plaintiff shows that an impermissible motive played a part in an
adverse employment decision, it thereby places the burden on the
defendant to show that it would have made the same decision in
the absence of the unlawful motive. 128 The Court said that Price
Waterhouse did not meet the burden by merely showing that Hop-
kins' interpersonal problems, such as her abrasiveness with staff
members, constitutes a legitimate reason for denying her a part-
nership. Price Waterhouse had to show that its legitimate reason,
122. Id. at 231-32.
123. Id. at 237. See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1120 (D.D.C.
1985).
124. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
125. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 237.
126. Id. at 258. This decision was later modified by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See
infra notes 169-206 and accompanying text.
127. Id. at 240, 242.
128. Id. at 248-50.
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standing alone, would have induced Price Waterhouse to deny
Hopkins a partnership. 129
At Price Waterhouse a senior manager becomes a candidate
for partnership when the partners in the local office submit the
manager's name as a candidate. All the other partners in the firm
are then invited to submit written comments on each candidate on
a long or short form depending on the degree of the partner's ex-
posure to the candidate.130 After reviewing the comments and in-
terviewing the partners who submitted them, the firm's admissions
committee makes a recommendation to the policy board. The rec-
ommendation will be one of the following: that the firm accept the
candidate for partnership, that it put the application on hold, or
that it deny the promotion outright. The policy board then decides
whether to submit the candidate's name to the entire partnership
for a vote, to hold her candidacy, or to reject her.13
Like the decisions of the Office of Umpire Development, 82 the
admissions committee's recommendations and the decisions of the
policy board at Price Waterhouse are not controlled by fixed
guidelines. A certain number of positive comments from the part-
ners would not guarantee a candidate admission to partnership nor
would a specific quantity of negative comments necessarily deflect
the application.33
Hopkins had worked at Price Waterhouse's office of govern-
ment service in Washington, D.C. for five years when the partners
in that office proposed her as a candidate for partnership. 3 4 Of the
662 partners at the firm at that time, seven were women. Of
eighty-eight persons proposed for partnership that year, she was
the only woman. Forty-seven of the candidates were admitted to
partnership, twenty-one were rejected, and twenty like Hopkins
were put on hold until the following year. Of the thirty-two part-
ners who submitted comments about Hopkins, thirteen supported
her, three recommended putting her bid on hold, eight had no
opinion, and eight said "deny."1 35
In a prepared statement supporting her candidacy, the part-
ners in Hopkins' office had showcased her successful two-year ef-
fort to secure $25 million in contracts from the State Department,
129. Id. at 250-52.
130. Id. at 232.
131. Id.
132. See supra notes 41 and 78 and accompanying text.
133. Id. at 232-33.
134. Id. at 233.
135. Id.
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labeling it "an outstanding performance" and one that Hopkins
carried out "virtually at partner level." 136 Judge Gerhard Gesell
specifically found that she had played a key role in winning the
State Department contract. In fact, Gesell went on, no other part-
nership candidate of Price Waterhouse that year had a record com-
parable to Hopkins' in securing major contracts for the
partnership.137
The partners in Hopkins' office praised her character as well
as her accomplishments, describing her in a joint statement as an
outstanding professional who had a deft touch and a strong charac-
ter with independence and integrity.13 8 Clients agreed with this as-
sessment. In fact, at trial a State Department official described her
as extremely competent, intelligent, strong, forthright, very pro-
ductive, energetic, and creative. 3 9 Another official praised her de-
cisiveness, broad-mindedness and intellectual clarity. In his words,
she was a "stimulating conversationalist. '"1 10
It was said, however, that on too many occasions Hopkins' ag-
gressiveness became abrasiveness, and staff members seemed to
have borne the brunt of her brusqueness. Partners evaluating her
work had counseled her to improve her relations with staff mem-
bers. Later evaluations indicated an improvement, but virtually all
of the partners' negative remarks about her, even those of support-
ive partners, discussed her flawed "interpersonal skills. M4 1
One partner described her as "macho." Another said she
"over-compensated" for being a woman. A third said she should
take a course at a charm school.1 41 Other partners criticized her use
of profanity. One replied that these partners objected only "be-
cause it's a lady using foul language." 43 Ironically, many in base-
ball believed that the use of strong language on the baseball dia-
mond disqualified a woman from being an umpire.14 4
Still another partner delivered the coup de grace, saying that
in order to improve her chances for partnership, Hopkins should
"walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femi-
ninely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry. 14 5
136. Id.
137. Id. at 233-34.
138. Id. at 234.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 234-35.
142. Id. at 235.
143. Id.
144. See POSTEMA & WOJCIECHOWSKI, supra note 1, at 162.
145. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989).
[Vol. 11:1
18
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 3
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol11/iss1/3
MAJOR LEAGUE GENDER DISCRIMINATION
At trial, Dr. Susan Fiske, a social psychologist at Carnegie-
Mellon University, testified that the partnership process at Price
Waterhouse was likely influenced by sex stereotyping.146 Fiske's
testimony focused not only on overly sex-based comments of part-
ners but also on gender-neutral remarks that were heavily critical
of Hopkins made by partners who knew her only slightly. One
partner said that Hopkins was universally disliked by the staff,
while another described her as consistently annoying and irritat-
ing, even though they had had very little contact with her.147
According to Fiske, in terms reminiscent of those applied to
Pam Postema, Hopkins' uniqueness as the only woman in the pool
of candidates and the subjectivity of the evaluations made it likely
that such sharply critical comments were the product of sex stere-
otyping, although Fiske could not say with certainty whether any
particular comment was the result of stereotyping.
148
Female candidates for partnership in past years at Price
Waterhouse had also been evaluated in sex-based terms. 49 In fact,
in previous years one male partner had repeatedly commented that
he could not consider any woman seriously as a partnership candi-
date because he believed that women were not even capable of
functioning as senior managers. The firm took no action to discour-
age his comments and recorded his vote in the overall summary of
the evaluation. 150 His views echo the opinions of some of Pam Pos-
tema's colleagues in the umpiring ranks who openly stated women
should not be umpires.' 5 1
The trial judge found that Price Waterhouse legitimately em-
phasized interpersonal skills in making its partnership decision
and that the firm had not fabricated its complaints about Hopkins'
interpersonal relationships as a pretext for discrimination. 5 1 Yet
Judge Gesell decided that some partners' remarks about Hopkins
stemmed "from an impermissibly cabined view"' 53 and that Price
Waterhouse had done nothing to disavow reliance on them. 54 The
trial judge concluded, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that Price
Waterhouse had unlawfully discriminated against Hopkins on the
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 236.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., POSTEMA & WOJCIECHOWSKI, supra note 1, at 22.
152. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 236.
153. Id. at 236-37.
154. Id. at 237.
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basis of sex."'
The Supreme Court said that in passing Title VII Congress
made the simple but momentous announcement that sex, race, re-
ligion, and national origin are not relevant to the selection, evalua-
tion, or compensation of an employee. 1 6 The intent of Congress to
forbid employers from taking gender into account in making em-
ployment decisions appears on the face of the statute. 15 7 The law
forbids an employer to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual" or otherwise "to limit, segregate, or classify his employ-
ees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's.. . sex."' 58 The Court said, "We take these words
to mean that gender must be irrelevant to employment
decisions.' 9
Price Waterhouse charged that Hopkins produced no evidence
that sex stereotyping played a role in the decision to place her can-
didacy on hold. °60 Hopkins showed that the partnership solicited
evaluations from all the firm's partners, that it generally relied
very heavily on such evaluations in making its decisions, that some
of the partners' comments were the product of stereotyping, and
that the firm in no way disclaimed reliance on those particular
comments either in Hopkins' case or in the past. 6'
The Supreme Court found that it was "plausible" and "inevi-
table' 6 2 to conclude that the policy board at Price Waterhouse in
making its decision did in fact take into account all of the part-
ners' comments, including comments that were motivated by stere-
otypical notions about women's proper deportment. 63 The Court
also found that many of the suspect comments were made in the
context of favorable reviews by Hopkins' supporters and that such
statements, even in otherwise favorable reviews, would influence
the decision-makers to think less highly of the candidate. 1 6 The
policy board in fact did not simply tally the "yesses" and "noes"
regarding a candidate but carefully reviewed the content of sub-
155. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
156. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 240 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)(2)(a)(1),(2)).
159. 490 U.S. 228, 240.
160. Id. at 256.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 257.
[Vol. 11:1
20
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 3
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol11/iss1/3
MAJOR LEAGUE GENDER DISCRIMINATION
mitted comments. Even if they were made by persons outside the
decision-making chain, such comments were important to the pol-
icy board in making partnership decisions. 1' s The Supreme Court
concluded by stating:
We hold that when a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that her
gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the
defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the
same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff's gender into
account."'8
165. Id.
166. Id. at 258. As for Hopkins, on remand, the district court held that the firm had
failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have denied her partnership
even in the absence of sexually-biased evaluation. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 737 F.
Supp 1202, 1207 (D.D.C. 1990). The court ordered that the firm make Hopkins a partner
effective July 1, 1990 and awarded her back pay. Faced with the question of whether it
should force Price Waterhouse to make Hopkins a partner, Judge Gesell noted that while
"extreme workplace hostility and disruption may influence a court to deny reinstatement,"
this was not such a case. Id. at 1210. Price Waterhouse had over 900 partners spread among
90 offices, and only a few partners had ever met Hopkins. The judge concluded that Price
Waterhouse lacked the intimacy and the interdependence of smaller partnerships, so con-
cerns about the freedom of association have little force. Id. Gesell ruled that front pay was
not a viable alternative, because Hopkins' claim that partnership was always her objective
could not be tested. The alternative of front pay for the rest of Hopkins' business life does
not appear to make her whole and might well provide a wholly unwarranted windfall. The
court said it could not determine whether she will be a successful, inadequate, or superior
partner. Nor could it determine how factors affecting her health, availability, or the firm's
own fortunes might impinge on her earnings. In addition, the court was skeptical as to
whether monetary relief alone would provide a sufficient deterrent against future discrimi-
nation for a group of highly paid partners. Id. at 1211. "Given these considerations," the
district court stated, "equity favors the course that will most vindicate the purpose of sex-
discrimination statute, consistent with established national policy." Id.
Two days before she was to become a partner under the decree, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia stayed the injunction pending the outcome of any appeal by
Price Waterhouse. The Appeals Court ruled that Price Waterhouse had to give a partner-
ship to Hopkins, a decision that was hailed by lawyers and women's rights groups as a vic-
tory that would strengthen the position of women in the workplace. The judge also ordered
Price Waterhouse to give Hopkins back pay and interest from 1983, totaling over $370,000.
Hopkins, who had taken a position at the World Bank said she intended to accept the part-
nership: "I think it's time we stop the litigating and get back to work." Ann Hagedorn &
Wade Lambert, Judge Orders Partnership in a Bias Case, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 1990, at B6.
Price-Waterhouse continued to maintain, "Our professionals are judged solely by non-dis-
criminatory and business criteria." Id.
Furthermore, in 1990 a federal court judge ruled that a prominent Philadelphia law
firm was guilty of sex discrimination when it refused to make Nancy O'Mara Ezold a part-
ner in 1989. The judge said that Wolf, Block, Schorr, and Solis-Cohen applied tougher stan-
dards to women seeking partnerships than to men and that the firm promoted to partner-
ship men whose evaluations were substantially the same or inferior to Ezold's. Ezold found
work at a five-lawyer firm in Philadelphia but sought to be made a partner at Wolf, Block,
where she had spent six years. It was the first suit against a law firm to go to trial charging
sex discrimination in partnership decisions. Five percent of the partners and 30% of the
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It has been lawsuits like Hishon and Price Waterhouse over
the past quarter century that have given shape and force to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.117 Though bias persists, these
cases have helped many women by lifting the "more obvious" bar-
riers to equal treatment.1 6s
associates at Wolf, Black at the time were women. Ezold said she was told she could become
a partner if she were willing to take over the firm's domestic relations department, but she
would never be more than an associate in the litigation department. In addition, she was
assigned less complex cases than the men in the year preceding the partnership decision and
thus did not get the exposure critical to partnership decisions. Wolf, Block appealed the
decision. Tamar Lewin, Sex Bias Found in Awarding of Partnerships at Law Firm, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 1990, at B5.
In 1992 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit threw out part of the Ezold
decision, ruling that the trial judge had used the wrong standard in finding sex discrimina-
tion at Wolf, Block. The Court of Appeals said that the lower court judge "impermissibly
substituted its own subjective judgment for that of Wolf in determining that Ezold met the
firm's partnership standards." Junda Woo, Part of Law Firm Sex-Bias Decision Rejected
on Appeal, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 1992, at B7. The appeals court ruled that the trial judge's
analysis was faulty when he found that the law firm treated Ezold differently from men with
equal abilities. The trial judge had ruled that even though Wolf, Block partners did not
believe that Ezold's legal analysis abilities were up to par, the firm promoted to partner
some men who had equal deficiencies. Although the men who made partner did have inade-
quacies, when it came to legal analysis, they were considered better than Ezold by the firm,
said the Court of Appeals. The court also disputed each of the four examples of sex discrim-
ination that the trial court found. The trial judge found that a partner had evaluated Ezold
negatively for her interest in "women's issues." The appeals court said the judge should
have taken into consideration that the partner testified that his words had been miscon-
strued. Id.
The Appeals Court did not address whether the trial judge had the authority to force
Wolf, Block to give Ezold a partnership to correct the alleged sex discrimination. That part
of the original ruling was considered a legal landmark. Because the Third Circuit left that
aspect of the case untouched, it can be cited as precedent in other sex discrimination cases
involving law firms. Id.
On February 4, 1993, the 13-member Third Circuit Court of Appeals refused to rehear
the case. Ezold says she will appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Lawyer Denied a
Rehearing in Sex-Bias Suit Against Firm, N.Y. TliEs, Feb. 5, 1993, at B16.
167. Martha Brannigan, The Pioneers: Women Who Fought Sex Bias on Job Prove to
Be a Varied Group, WALL ST. J., June 8, 1987, at 1.
168. Id. Winning a sex discrimination case is not easy, and neither is living with the
consequences. The cases are numerous. For example, Lorena Weeks was a clerk with South-
ern Bell Telephone Company. She wanted a higher-paying job as a switchman, but the com-
pany cited a state law barring women from lifting more than 30 pounds (the average weight
of a two-year-old child) on the job. The company claimed that the law made promotion
impossible. Weeks sued in 1969 and won a landmark decision opening up switchman (now
called "switching-equipment technician") and other formerly all-male jobs. Weeks held the
position for two years. She was forced to weather the resentment of supervisors and to fight
for training and favorable postings. She learned what many women learn: Winning in court
is often only a start. Id.
In 1967 Leah Rosenfeld fought Southern Pacific Company to get a better-paying job as
an agent telegrapher. The railroad said that the job was closed to women under a California
law barring them from working overtime and lifting more than 25 pounds. Rosenfeld got the
law voided in federal court. She got the job but then had to fend off sexist jabs by male co-
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VI. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
In response to a series of adverse Supreme Court decisions,
like Price Waterhouse, that made it more difficult for victims of
job bias to win cases,"6 9 Congress, after a long fight, finally passed
workers. Id.
Dianne Rawlinson had a degree in psychology with an emphasis on counseling criminals
but could not get a guard job at a prison because at 5'2" and 120 pounds, she was not tall or
heavy enough. Rawlinson was instead working in a beauty shop. She mentioned her situa-
tion to a customer, lawyer Pam Horowitz, who filed a lawsuit and got the law thrown out.
Rawlinson got the guard job but was branded a troublemaker. She was harassed by some
supervisors, then transferred to another prison and placed under investigation. Her victory
was a hollow one. Id. at 13.
Shyamala Rajender was an assistant professor of chemistry in 1972 and the only woman
in her department at the University of Minnesota. She was denied promotion to a tenure
track position. She filed a sex discrimination case and was traumatized by the trial, at which
one professor said she was so bad that 150 students left her class in one semester. She
produced records showing few transfers. Settled in 1980 by consent decree, the University
had to have sex-neutral criteria for hiring, promotion, and tenure and to institute an affirm-
ative action plan giving hiring preference to women with qualifications close to men's. Id.
Penny Harrington became the first woman police chief in the United States in Port-
land, Oregon in 1984. Since 1972, Harrington had filed 40 administrative complaints with
the state, charging the police force with various acts of job discrimination against her. Grad-
ually, she rose to captain and maintained her popularity until she became chief. She later
resigned under pressure, and a special commission issued a scathing evaluation stating that
as chief she had lost the confidence of many officers and that the department was in tur-
moil. She blamed what happened on sexism and has filed a sex discrimination suit in federal
court. Id.
See also SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN
388-92 (1992), offering an account of Diane Joyce who was the first female to hold a "skilled
craft" position in Santa Clara County, California when she became a road dispatcher. She
won a Supreme Court case (Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1986)), but co-
workers harassed her while she worked for four years on a road crew. Fellow workers
changed instructions on how to drive bob-tail trucks and gave her wrong driving tips that
nearly blew engines. The supervisor would not issue her a pair of coveralls until she filed a
grievance to get them. The ladies room was kept locked, and men did not let her use their
bathroom. The day after the Supreme Court decision, a friend sent her a congratulatory
bouquet that she arranged in a vase. The next day she found the flowers crushed in a gar-
bage bin. The road foreman claimed to have "drop-kicked them across the yard." Id. at 392.
169. In the 1980's the legal system grew increasingly inhospitable toward individual
race and sex discrimination cases. Lawyers were declining to take such cases because they
were time-consuming and difficult to win and brought far less money than other types of
civil litigation like personal injury suits, which permit punitive damages. In addition, law-
yers faced conservative judges who were bored by, if not downright hostile to such cases.
The National Employment Lawyers Association, comprising 1,000 plaintiff-lawyers, revealed
that 44% of its members rejected more than 90% of the job discrimination cases brought to
them. Steven A. Holmes, Workers Find It Tough Going Filing Lawsuits Over Job Bias,
N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1991, at Al, A17. One of the major reasons for this reluctance on the
part of lawyers to take on job-bias claims was a number of adverse Supreme Court cases. Id.
at A17.
By the late 1980's it was extremely difficult for an attorney to earn a living in employ-
ment discrimination. The case had to be an excellent one, and the plaintiff had to have the
resources to finance it, meaning few poor or working class plaintiffs were represented. When
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the Civil Rights Act of 1991,170 which dramatically broadened
rights for millions of working women. As the Price Waterhouse
case illustrates, acts of discrimination may be motivated by many
factors, only one of which may be illegal. Hopkins was denied a
partnership for several reasons, one of which was gender-related.
Under the holding of Price Waterhouse, the accounting firm had
the opportunity, with a proper showing, to avoid liability. The
Civil Rights Act of 1991, however, significantly modified the Price
Waterhouse case because it provides that if a termination or other
employment practice is motivated in part by illegal discrimination,
the practice violates the Title VII."' Thus, the opportunity for an
employer to escape liability by showing that the same decision
would have been made regardless of gender is eliminated. Section
107(a) of the Act provides that "an unlawful employment practice
is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for
any employment practice even though other factors also motivated
the practice.17 2 This section pertains to the so-called "mixed mo-
tive" cases and renders illegal employment decisions based on, or
motivated in part by, an illegal discriminatory factor. The Act thus
overturns that portion of the Supreme Court decision in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins that permitted an employer to defeat a
plaintiff's claim by demonstrating that the same challenged action
would have been taken without consideration of discriminatory
factors.17
3
Under the 1991 Act, the presence of a discriminatory factor is
dispositive of liability and leaves open only the question of rem-
edy. Although an employer may escape some damages, including
back pay and reinstatement, by showing that the same action
would have been taken absent the discriminatory factor, a court
private lawyers did not take cases, the EEOC did not pick up the slack. In 1990 the EEOC
filed 524 lawsuits in federal court, an increase over the 486 suits in 1989. In 1990 the EEOC
had a backlog of 45,000 cases. Id.
170. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071-74 (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1993)).
171. Karen Morris, New Faces of Discrimination/New Challenges for Employers: The
Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Americans with Disabilities Act 5 (1992) (unpublished
paper, on file with author).
172. Pub. L. No. 102-166 §107(a), 105 Stat. 1075 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m)
(West Supp. 1993)) (emphasis added). This subsection states that "an unlawful employment
practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though
other factors also motivated the practice." Id.
173. See Hon. Theodore McMillian, The Civil Rights Act of 1991-One Step Forward
on a Long Road, 22 STETSON L. REv. 69, 74-75 (1992).
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may now award declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attor-
ney's fees and costs. 74
Civil rights and women's groups pushed for language in the
1991 Act outlawing any consideration of race or sex, in an effort to
overturn Price Waterhouse.17 1 These groups argued that the Price
Waterhouse decision allowed sexism and racism to exist on the job,
even if they were not the main factors for the denial of hiring and
promotion and sought the provision outlawing all of these
factors.176
Women have always had the right to sue employers for dis-
crimination. For the first time under this new law, however,
women, who comprise forty-six percent of all workers, 177 now can
sue for punitive damages for sexual harassment, damages for pain
and suffering, as well as for back pay.1
78
The new law also permits jury trials in discrimination cases.7 9
Jury trials are viewed as being harder for employers to win than
trials heard by judges, because juries generally consist of peers of
the employee.1 80
Proponents of the law say the changes represent long-overdue
justice for women, as well as for minorities and the handicapped,
who face major hurdles in bringing employment discrimination ac-
tions.' The result of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 will undoubt-
edly be more lawsuits about hiring, firing, promotion, and on-the-
job behavior like sexual harassment. 18 2 The greatest impact will
probably be a substantial increase in cash awards to women and
the disabled who sue for deliberate job bias.' The new law says
job bias based on sex, disability, religion, or national origin will
now be punished as severely as employment discrimination based
on race.
Unlike the Civil Rights Act of 1964184 and the Americans with
174. Id. at 75.
175. Steven A. Holmes, Lawyers Expect Ambiguities in New Rights Law to Bring
Years of Lawsuits, N.Y. TimEs, Dec. 27, 1991, at A20.
176. Id.
177. Bruce D. Butterfield, Civil Rights Bill Will Mean More Worker Lawsuits, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Nov. 3, 1991, at Al.
178. Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 102, 105 Stat. 1072-74 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1981a (West Supp. 1993)).
179. Id. at § 1073.
180. Butterfield, supra note 177, at Al.
181. Butterfield, supra note 177, at A7.
182. Timothy Noah & Albert R. Karr, What New Civil Rights Law Will Mean:
Charges of Sex, Disability Bias Will Multiply, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 1991, at Bi.
183. Id.
184. See supra note 60-72 and accompanying text.
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Disabilities Act (ADA),18 5 the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not set
forth major new requirements for employers to change their per-
sonnel practices. 186 Rather, under the Act the employer will have
to demonstrate that the allegedly discriminatory practice is job-
related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity. 18 7 The legislation fails to define "business necessity" or
"job-related," so clarification of those key terms will be left to the
courts. 188 Congress did stress that its purpose was to return to the
more liberal standards in place before a series of Supreme Court
cases in 1989 made it so difficult for job-bias plaintiffs to win
lawsuits.189
The passage of the 1991 law looked like an auspicious develop-
ment for Postema's case, but in an authoritative statement of pol-
icy on December 30, 1991, the EEOC declared that the law does
not apply to the thousands of cases filed by people like her who
claim that they suffered job discrimination before the Act was
signed into law by President Bush on November 21, 1991.190
This ruling means that workers who filed complaints of dis-
crimination before that date-Postema filed in 1989-must try to
prevail under the old rules, which makes it much harder to prove
discrimination.191 This decision could limit the compensation Pos-
tema will obtain if she wins.19
Under the EEOC's policy, the benefits of the new law, includ-
ing jury trials and punitive and compensatory damages of up to
$300,000 would also be unavailable to people who file lawsuits in
the future complaining of discriminatory conduct that occurred
before November 21, 1991.11
Whether the new law would apply to pending cases like Pos-
tema's was an important and disputed question during the two
years that Congress and the White House were in conflict over the
proposed law, but neither the statute nor the legislative history re-
solved the issue. The question may ultimately be appealed to the
185. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-213 (West
Supp. 1993)).
186. Paul M. Barrett, Some Specifics About the New Law, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 1991,
at B1.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Robert Pear, Agency Prohibits Use of Law in Old Bias Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
31, 1991, at Al.
191. Id.
192. See id.
193. Id.
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Supreme Court.'
The EEOC did acknowledge that parts of the law created "an
inference" that it should apply to pending cases of past discrimina-
tion. 95 But the EEOC also said that the Supreme Court's most
recent decisions suggest that the law should not be construed to
have retroactive effect when the language of the statute or intent
of Congress is ambiguous.'
Civil rights lawyers cite cases going back two centuries to sup-
port their argument that, as Chief Justice John Marshall said in
1801, "new laws affecting great national concerns often have 'retro-
spective operation.' ,,'n1 In a 1974 case involving desegregation of
public schools in Richmond, 19 the Supreme Court held that a new
law authorizing an award of lawyers' fees should be applied retro-
actively. The Court said, "[A] court is to apply the law in effect at
the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in
manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative his-
tory to the contrary."'199 In 1988, however, in Bowen v. Georgetown
University Hospital,00 involving the payment of hospitals under
certain Medicare rules, the Supreme Court said that "retroactivity
is not favored in the law," 0' and for that reason an agency cannot
adopt retroactive rules unless Congress has explicitly given it au-
thority to do so.2 02
The EEOC has argued both points of view. While the commis-
sion agreed that an employer would suffer manifest injustice if re-
quired to pay damages for conduct that occurred before the law
required such a penalty, the commission also argued that "in light
of the public concerns inherent in Civil Rights Act litigation, re-
quiring employers to pay unforeseen damages for unlawful discrim-
ination is not manifestly unjust. 2 0 3 Two sections of the law con-
tain specific exemptions for conduct occurring before it was signed
into law, which civil rights lawyers say there would be no need for,
if the law applied only to future cases, as the EEOC and the Jus-
tice Department contended.0 4
194. Id.
195. Id. at A14.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
199. Id. at 711.
200. 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
201. Id. at 208.
202. Id.
203. Pear, supra note 190, at A14 (quoting the EEOC).
204. Id. Civil rights lawyers say that the EEOC decision would severely limit the im-
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The district court in Postema's case originally held that the
1991 Act's provisions for jury trials and damages were retroactive.
The district judge, however, certified an order for appeal, and the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted an interlocutory
appeal. 0 5 The Second Circuit reversed the district court's decision,
holding that the jury trial and damages provisions of the 1991 Civil
Rights Act are not retroactive and remanded Postema's case.20 6
VII. CONCLUSION
Former baseball commissioner Fay Vincent says that the day
will come when a woman umpire reaches the major leagues. "I
think it would be terrific if we had women umpires. And if they are
able to perform at the level we expect, I see no reason why they
shouldn't. '11 7 However, when Pam Postema was dismissed from
her umpiring position, the conclusion was that she simply did not
have the ability to work in the majors. 0 8 One umpire, Terry Tata,
commented, "Along with Pam, several other umpires who were
considered non-prospects were let go. You might as well let them
get on with their lives instead of allowing them to kick around the
minor leagues for years and years and develop bad habits."209
Harry Wendlestedt, a veteran National League umpire said, "My
feeling is that Pam was mistreated during her career. She was al-
ways in the public eye and never really allowed to learn and pro-
gress on her own without people badgering her. '210
It is the mission of Postema's lawyer to prove that her firing
was based on her gender, not a lack of talent. The jury will have to
be convinced that Postema's performance merited an opportunity
pact of the new law. Job discrimination based on race or sex was illegal before November 21,
1991. All the new law does is make discrimination easier to prove and increase penalties. Id.
Joseph M. Sellers, director of equal opportunity employment programs, stated, "From
the plain language of the statute, it should be clear Congress intended the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 to apply to pending cases." Id. The Supreme Court would likely side with the EEOC
on this issue. Yet a major purpose of the new law was to overturn several Supreme Court
decisions that made it harder for victims of discrimination to win in court. Under the new
law, a plaintiff can demand a jury trial and blacks and women say that they get speedier
and fairer decisions from juries rather than judges. In addition, women can seek damages for
emotional distress, pain and suffering, mental anguish, humiliation, and other non-pecuni-
ary losses caused by an employer's discriminatory actions. Id.
205. Postema v. National League, Nos. 92-9150, 92-9152, 92-9154, U.S. App. LEXIS
15504 (2d Cir. June 25, 1993).
206. Id. at *3.
207. Altavilla, supra note 21, at 28.
208. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
209. Altavilla, supra note 21, at 28.
210. Altavilla, supra note 21, at 28.
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to work in the majors. The problem is that decision to fire her was
made subjectively by her supervisors who had the same mindset as
those men who denied promotions to Elizabeth Hishon and Ann
Hopkins.
Postema's dismissal left Theresa Cox as the only female um-
pire in the minor leagues until Cox was released in 1992 from the
Arizona League.211 Today, ball girls are the only women left on the
baseball field, and some major league teams, such as the Mets, the
Phillies, and the Cubs, do not require ball girls to have the same
athletic ability or perform the same clubhouse chores as do ball
boys. Nor are ball boys required to wear tight shorts.212 All the ball
girls need is poise, good looks, and an ability to turn down fans'
requests for souvenir balls pleasantly. 13 In fact, Theresa Cox said
that she thought "klutzy" ball girls reinforced the very stereotypes
that cost her a career in the minors. "Everyone believes girls can't
throw or catch until someone proves them different." 1 '
Major league baseball has never been ahead of the times when
it comes to human relations and civil rights. In recent years the
major leagues have come under intense scrutiny because of the
paucity of African-Americans in baseball's front offices and, until
recently, in the positions of field managers and coaches.21 5 How can
it be expected that women will gain admission to baseball's umpir-
ing ranks without a fight, especially when one manager said, "No
matter how good [Postema] is, I don't think she'll be the one"? 21 6
As another manager put it, "I think she might be able to handle it.
But I just think our sport's not ready for her. '217
With sentiments like those above, Pam Postema will have an
uphill battle winning her case, because judgments about umpires'
performances are so subjective. The court should remind itself that
in baseball success is inseparable from failure.21 8 Journalist George
211. Alessandra Stanley, Among Baseball's Ball Girls, Fielding Skills Take 2d Place,
N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1992, at Al.
212. Id.
213. Id. at B3.
214. Id.
215. Claire Smith, On Baseball: Hold the Game to a Special Moral Standard, N.Y.
TIMES, June 3, 1992, at Bll. As of 1993, there are four black managers in the major leagues:
Dusty Baker of the San Francisco Giants, Cito Gaston of the Toronto Blue Jays, Hal McRae
of the Kansas City Royals, and Don Baylor of the Colorado Rockies. In addition, there are
two Hispanic managers: Felipe Alou of the Montreal Expos and Tony Perez of the Cincin-
nati Reds. Walter Leavy, Baseball's Minority Managers: Taking Charge on the Field, EB-
ONY, May 1993, at 110.
216. POSTEMA & WOJCIECHOWSKI, supra note 1, at 122.
217. Id.
218. George F. Will, The Keepers of the Rules, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 6, 1992, at 72.
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F. Will commented, "The World Series winner is likely to be
beaten about 70 times on the way to glory. Any batter who fails,
say, only two thirds of the time for a dozen seasons goes to Coo-
perstown. But umpires are supposed to be perfect and anony-
mous." 19 Umpires are also supposed to do something humanly im-
possible-get everything right in what everyone says is a game of
inches: the difference between a ball and a strike or whether a run-
ner is safe or out. "Good umpires earn their reputations being right
about inches in the heat and blur of action," Will also stated,2 0
and Pam Postema did it under extraordinary pressure.
Will went on to add, "Sport presupposes equality for the pur-
pose of establishing inequality-a level playing field on which some
will achieve the pre-eminence of the highest attainment. '221 Pam
Postema seeks a level playing field, and if justice prevails, she will
win her case. As baseball official Dick Butler said, "She's got to be
better because of the fact that she's a girl. I'm not saying it's fair.
It's just the situation. I don't think it's fair but it exists and she's
not going to change it."22
2
Why can't a woman be an umpire, or a coach, a manager, or
even a player if she has the ability to do the job? As with a part-
nership in a law or accounting firm or a managerial position at a
major airline or a Fortune 500 company, ability, not gender, should
be the only criterion for employment in any league. Many of Pam
Postema's detractors suggested that she should "go back to the
kitchen." Where she wants to go is behind the plate.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. POSTEMA & WOJclECHOWSKI, supra note 1, at 153.
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